USA v. Yunio;Canaca by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-14-2012 
USA v. Yunio;Canaca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Yunio;Canaca" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 173. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/173 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4630 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
YUNIO CANACA, a/k/a Jairo Garcia-Canaca,  
a/k/a Luis Fernandez-Mensias, a/k/a Jose Antonio Romero-Canaca,  
a/k/a Alberto Soto-Mendez, a/k/a Daniel Hernandez-Martinez 
 
Yunio Canaca,  
 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(M.D. Pa. 4:11-CR-0128-001) 
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 October 26, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 14, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Yunio Canaca (“Canaca”) pled guilty to illegal re-entry into the United States after 
having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  The District Judge concluded that 
although Canaca was subject to a Sentencing Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months of 
imprisonment, he would grant a downward variance.  Canaca received a 12 month 
sentence followed by three years of supervised release.  Appellate counsel has filed a 
brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that no non-
frivolous issues exist for appeal, and now seeks to withdraw as counsel representing 
Canaca.  For the reasons set forth below, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and 
affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court. 
 Canaca first entered the United States from Mexico in February of 1996, without 
inspection by an immigration officer.  Between February of 1996 and December of 2006, 
Canaca entered the U.S. illegally on numerous occasions.  Each time, he was removed 
from the country, either by being deported following a criminal conviction, or by 
agreeing to leave voluntarily after being detained by immigration officials.     
I. Background 
 On February 24, 2011 Pennsylvania State Police stopped Canaca during a routine 
traffic stop.  He admitted to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents that 
he had re-entered the country without being admitted or paroled.  Canaca pled guilty in 
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a one-count indictment for 
illegal re-entry after being convicted of an aggravated felony.    
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Canaca requested a downward variance to time served because: (1) although 
Canaca was being sentenced in a non-fast-track district, he would have qualified for a 
fast-track disposition in such a district and would have pled guilty, waiving his appellate 
rights, if he had been offered such a disposition and (2) that the seriousness of his 
criminal history was overstated.  While recognizing that Canaca’s fast-track disparity 
argument had some merit, the Court sought to balance Canaca’s argument against his 
own criminal history, which included multiple illegal re-entries and deportations and two 
convictions for the sale of a controlled substance.  Ultimately, the District Court imposed 
a sentence of 12 months of imprisonment, representing a downward variance of three 
months. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. Jur isdiction 
 “In 
III. Standard of Review 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court explained the 
general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when 
the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued representation on the grounds that 
there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Under Anders, counsel seeking to withdraw from representation must 
“satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable 
issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Id. at 780.  “The Court’s inquiry 
when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold:  (1) whether counsel adequately 
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fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements; and (2) whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where frivolousness is patent, however, “we 
will not appoint new counsel even if an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge current 
counsel’s obligations to his or her client and this court.”  United States v. Coleman
 We review a district court’s sentence in two stages: first, we ensure that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error; second, we consider whether or 
not the sentence is substantively reasonable.  
, 575 
F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 Counsel’s brief identifies three potential issues for appeal, none of which is non-
frivolous.  First, he proffers that Canaca might challenge the jurisdiction of the District 
Court.  Second, counsel suggests that Canaca may dispute the procedural validity or 
voluntariness of his guilty plea.  Finally, counsel proposes that Canaca may seek review 
of the legality or reasonableness of the sentence. 
IV. Analysis 
 The government agrees with Canaca’s counsel that no non-frivolous issues 
exist.  Furthermore, Canaca has not filed a pro se brief to suggest otherwise. 
 We agree with counsel and the government that no non-frivolous issues exist.  
Counsel has reviewed the record in a genuine effort to identify any potentially appealable 
issues, and has discovered none.  Because counsel’s Anders brief  “initially appears to be 
5 
 
adequate on its face…[a] complete scouring of the record” is unnecessary.  Youla
The first argument counsel identifies is that the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear Canaca’s case.  This argument is entirely without merit.  District courts have 
jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States.  18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
Canaca was charged with federal criminal offenses.   The District Court had jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Canaca did not object to the District Court’s jurisdiction prior to entering his 
guilty plea, thus waiving any challenge to personal jurisdiction.  
, 241 
F.3d at 300.   
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
12(b)(3) and (e)
 
.   
The second argument identified by counsel is that Canaca’s guilty plea was, in 
fact, procedurally invalid or involuntary.  This argument is also frivolous.  In challenging 
the voluntariness of his guilty plea, Canaca bears the burden of establishing that the trial 
court failed to comply with Boykin v. Alabama
The final argument raised by counsel is that the sentence imposed by the District 
Court was unreasonable.  The argument is without merit.  The District Court complied 
with the procedural safeguards outlined in 
, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) and Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11.  Here, Canaca is unable to meet such a burden.  The indictment 
itself was clear on its face.  Furthermore, during the plea hearing the District Court and 
the government were careful to ensure that Canaca understood the underlying charge 
against him, the rights he was waiving by virtue of a guilty plea, and the consequences 
that would flow from his plea, including exposure to incarceration.  Based on these facts, 
there is no issue of arguable merit as to the validity or voluntariness of Canaca’s plea.   
Tomko. 562 F.3d at 567; see also United 
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States v. Gunter
The only remaining question is whether the sentence was substantively reasonable.  
This step requires us to determine whether the District Court abused its discretion by 
failing to properly consider the relevant sentencing factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  When explaining the sentence, the District Court was obligated to “set forth 
enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]…ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] 
own legal decision making authority.”  
, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Court calculated the Guidelines 
range, ruled on requests for departures and variances, and then considered the §3553(a) 
factors prior to imposing sentence.  The sentence was procedurally reasonable. 
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).  
An examination of the record shows that the District Court heard and considered all of 
Canaca’s arguments.  There was no abuse of discretion.  
We find that no non-frivolous issues exist for consideration on appeal.  We will 
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, pursuant to 
V. Conclusion 
Anders, and affirm the judgment and 
sentence of the District Court.  Counsel is relieved from any obligation to file a writ of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.  See
  
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b) 
(2012).   
